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1'he first section of the English Statute of Pratidsl
provides that "all Leases, Estates Interests of Freehold,
or Terms of Yeats, or any uncertain Interest of, in, to or out
of any Messuages, Manors, Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments, made or created by Livery of Seisin only or by
Parole, and not put in writing, and signed by the parties
so making or creating the same, or their Agents thereunto
lawfully authorized by writing, shall have the Force and
Effect of Leases or Estates at will only . . ." The
fourth section declares that: ". . . no Action shall be
brought . . to charge any person . . . upon
any contract or Sale of Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments,
or any Interest in or concerning them . . . unless the
Agreement upon which such Action shall be brought, or
129

Car. ii c. 3; 3 Stat. at Lar., p. 385.
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some Memorandum or Note thereof, shall be in Writing,
and signed by the Partie to be charged therewith, or some
'2
other Person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."
And finally the seventeenth section says that: .........
no Contract for the Sale of any Goods, Wares and Merchandizes, for the Price of ten Pounds Sterling or upwards,
shall be allowed to be good, except the Buyer shall accept
part of the Goods so sold, and actually receive the same, or
give something in earnest to bind the Bargain, or in Part
Payment, or that some Note or Memorandum in Writing
of the said bargain be made and signed by the Parties to be
charged by such Contract, or their Agents thereunto lawfully authorized." The question discussed in this paper
arises in those cases where only one party has signed the
contract or memorandum of contract. Under the circumstances indicated the party who has signed cannot charge
the other party either at law or in equity.3 Can the party
who has not signed successfully bring a bill in equity for
the specific performance of the contract against the party
who has signed? What effect in such a case has the objection of the defendant that there is "lack of mutuality"?
As bills for the specific performance of the sale of goods
are only allowed when the goods have some peculiar value,
the question is usually discussed in bills for the specific performance of contracts for the sale of an interest in real
property, that is contracts falling under the fourth section
above quoted. These I shall first examine. The first
reported case is that of Hatton v. Gray.4 The contract
in that case was for the sale of certain houses. It was
signed only by the defendant vendor. His counsel
argued that: "The note binds not him who signed it not
...
. and therefore in equity cannot bind the other
party, for both of them must be bound, or neither of them in
'Besides contracts concerning real property the fourth section deals
with (i) Promises of Executors or Administrators to answer damages
out of their own estates; (2) Promises to answer the debt or default
of another; (3) Agreements made in consideration of marriage; (4)
Agreements not to be performed within the space of .one year.
'Hawkins v. Holmes,
'2

Ch. Cas. 164, 1684.

i P. Wms. 770, 1721.
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equity." Yet the court granted the prayer of the plaintiff's
bill without reported comment. It will be observed that the
objection of the advocate is not that the remedy is not mutual, but rather that both have to be bound, that is that there
must be mutuality in obligation in order to have specific
performance. 5
In the next reported case, Coleman v. Upcot,0 the same
result as in Hatton v. Gray is reached. Two reasons were
given by the court for granting the prayer of the plaintiff's
bill. The first was, that as the statute only speaks of the
necessity for the signature of the party to be charged, and
as the party to be charged had signed, the statute was satisfied. The second reason was that the plaintiff by his bill
"hath submitted to perform what was required of his part
to be performed." As one or the other of these reasons
for granting specific performance in these cases has been
repeated ever since, two facts connected with them should
be pointed out. In the first place each reason is directed to.
a possible but distinct view of the Statute of Frauds. The
first assumes that the statute is a statute relating to the
evidence by which a certain class of obligations are to be
proved. In reply to the objection that the plaintiff is not
'The argument therefore reflects the early idea that equity requires
special mutuality of obligation in a contract before specific performance will be granted. See First Paper, May number, supra, page 270.
et seq. for a discussion of this.
There is another part of this case, in I Eq. Cas. Abr., p. 21 sec. 1o
which makes the court say, in answer to the objection that both or
neither were bound in tquity, "That it was decreed that they both
were bound." This 'would appear to imply that the court was of the
opinion, that where one party signed, he being bound, that fact bound
the party who had not signed. They might also have thought that
the plaintiff was bound because he had written 'the agreement, and so
had in effect signed,-though he had not put his name to the writing.
This last is the vilew of the case taken by Powell in his Essay on
Contracts, see pages 172, 173, 1790.

It is usual to regard the case as

standing for the proposition indicated in the report in "Cases in Chancery," namely, that if the defendant has signed, specific performance
will be given, though the plaintiff has not signed. The case of Capehart v. Hale, 6 W. Va. 547, 1873, pp. 551-555, contains a good discus-

sion of the two reports.

g5 Vin. Abr. 527, 1707.
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bound, this first argument contents itself with replying that
the statute speaks only of the party to be charged. The view
that the statute is a statute of evidence renders it unnecessary to show that the plaintiff is bound. It is sufficient to
point to the words of the statute as indicating that the
plaintiff has proved, in the method prescribed, that the
defendant is under legal obligations to him. Years afterwards, in the well-known case of Laythoarp v. Bayant,7
Chief Justice Tindal well expresses the argument which
rests on this view of the statute when he says: "The
defendant might have required the vendor's signature to the
contract; but the object of the Statute was to secure the
defendants, . . . I find . . . no reason for saying that the signature of both parties is that which makes
the agreement. The agreement in truth is made before any
signature."
On the other hand, the argument that the
plaintiff, by filing his bill renders himself liable to perform
his part of the contract, assumes that the statute does affect
the obligation of the parties. It admits that prior to the
filing of the bill there is no obligation on the plaintiff's
part, and seeks to avoid the effect of this admission, by
pointing out, that at the time the bill is brought, the plaintiff
is under obligation to the defendant.
In the second place it is to be noticed that both arguments
are directed to the alleged lack of mutuality in the obligation of the parties. Neither argument has anything to do
with the possible objection that there is lack of mutuality in
the remedy. If the position taken in the first paper of
this series is correct, namely, that the defence of lack of
mutuality in the remedy as a special defence in equity did
not appear until the nineteenth century, the fact that the
court in Coleman v. Upcot confined itself to a discussion of
the obligations of the parties, while it should not be forgotten, is not to be wondered at.
One or the other, or both, of the reasons above suggested
for granting specific performance of contracts subject to the
fourth section of the statute, though the plaintiff had not
signed, seems to have satisfied the profession, for Lord
72 Bing. N. C. 735, page 743.
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Hardwick, in Buckhouse v. Crosby,8 a case involving the
point, remarked, that he had often heard of the objection
of lack of mutuality being offered in such cases and as often
overruled. 9 This early practice was followed without question in two reported cases in the first years of the nineteenth
century,'0 and we have the testimony of Sir James Mansfield
that it was, in i8io, the common practice of the Court of
Chancery."
This steady current of authority was disturbed by the remarks made by Lord Redesdale in the
course of his opinion in Lawrenson v. Butler.'2 As heretofore explained this case did not involve any question under
the Statute of Frauds.' 3 It was impossible for the defendant
in that case to fulfill his contract to the letter. The plaintiff was willing to accept and asked that the court force the
defendant to fulfill the contract as far as he was able. The
defendant owing to his own default could not have had
specific performance of the plaintiff. Lord Redesdale dismissed the plaintiff's bill. The ground of his-action was lack
of mutuality, and in the course of his discussion of this subject he declares that the defence is also applicable to cases
where the plaintiff has not signed the contract or memorandum of contract. Referring to Hatton v. Gray, he says,
that there "it was considered as sufficient that the agreement
should be signed by the party against whom the performance
was sought, because such are the words of the Statute of
Frauds; now, such certainty is the import that no agreement
shall be in force, but it is signed by the party to be charged;
32

Eq. Cas. Abr. 32, pl. 44,

1736.

Reported as Backhouse v.

Mohun in a note to 3 Swanst., page 434.
'Another reported case is Child v. Comber, 3 Swanst. 423 note, 1723,
and dicta in Hawkins v. Holmes, I P. Win. 770, 1721. See also Owen
v. Davies, i Ves. Sr. 82, 1747; but in this case part of the purchase
money was paid.
"0Seto); v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265, 18o2, sometimes spoken of as Hunter
v. Seton, where Lord Eldon merely remarks that the signature of the
party defendant "makes him within the statute a party to be charged."
See also Fowle v. Freemen, 9 Ves. 351, 1804. A case before Sir Win.
Grant.
llen v. Bennet, 3 Taunt. i69.
i Sch. & Lef. i3, 1802.
u First Paper, May number, supra, page 270.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS.

but the statute does not say that every agreement so signed
shall be enforced; the statute is in the negative. To give it
this construction would, as I have heard it urged, make the
statute really a statute of frauds, for it would have enabled
any person who had procured another to sign an agreement
to make it depend wholly on his will and pleasure whether
it should be an agreement or not."' 4 The strength of this
argument lies in the assumption that the statute of frauds
affects the obligations of the parties, and that the party who
has not signed is in no way bound. Admitting this view of
the statute, and remembering that at the time the case was
decided there existed the idea that equity, to give specific
performance, required a mutuality of obligation not necessary at law, the position of Lord Redesdale, that relief
should not be given to the plaintiff who had not signed,
would appear unanswerable.
In spite, however, of the force of the argument, assuming
the view of the statute indicated, the settled practice to require only the defendant's signature, would have perhaps
prevented even comment on the Irish case had it not been for
the reputation of Lord Redesdale, and the fact that Lord
Eldon, in view of Lawrenson v. Butler, expressly refused to
state that the former practice of the court and his own decision in Seton v. Stade would be followed. In Huddleston
v. Briscoe,'5 the Lord Chancellor lays emphasis on the fact
that in the case before him the contract is signed by both
parties, remarking that he does so because in a book, which
he is persuaded will give muich information to the profession upon many important points, lie notes that Lord Redesdale has intimated a doubt whether the court would perform
a contract, signed by one party, adding, "I remark the circumstance as I would not be understood to pass it by without observing that it is not necessary to discuss that here."'"
" Page

20.

Ves. 583, 1805, page 592.
"The book referred to is Schoales and Lefroy's Reports of the

135

Decisions in Ireland of Lord Redesdale, Vol. I. Lawrenson v. Butler
is the only case in this book touching on the question. Lord Eldon
must have seen the proofs of this work, as his decision in Huddleston
v. Briscoe was rendered December 20, i8o5, and the preface to the
reports is dated June 3o, i8o6, the book being published in Dublin in
that year.
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In 1813 Vice Chancellor Plummer followed Lord Eldon
in expressly pointing out that he did not have to decide the
question in the case before him, 17

During the same year,

however, Lord Redesdale's opinion was expressly repudiated
in Ireland in the case of Ormond v. Anderson,18 by Lord
Chancellor Manners, on the ground that there does not
exist any provision in the Statute of Frauds to prevent the
execution of such an agreement. He however dismissed
the plaintiff's bill in the case before him on other grounds.
The next year Sir William Grant in Western v.Russell,19
seems to regard the question as settled in favor of the
plaintiff, though here again the question is not directly
20
involved in the decision. In 1820, in Martin v. Mitchel
the fact that the plaintiff in a bill for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land had not signed seems
to have been urged by the defendant's counsel. 2 1 Sir
Thomas Plummer, then Master of the Rolls, having decided
the case against the plaintiff on the ground that it was an improvident contract entered into by ignorant persons who had
been taken an unfair advantage of by the plaintiff, expressly
states that he does not "mean to disturb the prevailing
opinion that the party who has not signed may, nevertheless,
file a bill and compel execution of the contract." And indeed
in his examination of the subject, .he states, in a clear manner,,
the argument against the defendant's contention, based on
the conception of the statute as a statute relating to evidence.,
He says: "The doubt I have on that," the pretended lack of
mutuality, "is whether there is not mutuality; the one party
is to buy and the other to sell, and the contract is therefore in
its nature mutual, though not evidenced by a writing binding
on both. 22 Yet he at once confuses this argument with that
'Stratford v. Bosworth, 2

Ves. & B. 341, 1813, page 345.
Ball & B. 363, 1813, page 370.
193 Ves. & B. 187, 1814, page 192.
"2 J. & W. 413.
'See reply of plaintiff's counsel, page 418.

232

Page 426.

which admits that the statute does affect the obligation, saying: "It is considered that when the party files the bill he
does an act which will bind him and from that time there is
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mutuality." And following this last conception of the
statute he inclines to the opinion that before the party who
has not signed, signs or brings his bill for specific perform23
ance, the other party who has signed is at liberty to recede.
In spite of the confusion of thought in this opinion, Sir
Thomas Plummer does admit that it is settled that a plaintiff
who has not signed can have specific performance. The
conclusion has since been uniformly acquiesced in by the
24
English courts.
' Page 428. In the case before him the party who had not signed
subsequently entered into a contract which she did sign, with the
other party, to fulfill the first contract, and the court intimates, that as
nothing was given for the signature by the defendant it was not binding on the plaintiff. See page 427. This seems to be a further application of the same theory.
21 See Boys v. Ayerst, 6 Mad. 316, 1822, dicta.
Vice-Chancellor
Leach in this case, in admitting that the law is settled, expresses his
surprise, for "although such an agreement may satisfy the words of
the Statute of Frauds, yet a court of equity does not generally lend
its assistance to enforce agreements which are not mutual." See also
Flight v. Balland, 4 Rus. 298, 1828, page 3Ol, dicta; Palmer v. Scott,
I R. & M. 391, 183o; Field v. Boland, i D. & Wa. 37, 1837, Irish;
Sutherland v. Briggs, i Hare, 26, 1841, dicta; Semble, Dowell v. Dew,
Morgan v. Halford, t Sm. & Giff. 1o, 1852, dicta. Since the case
last cited the writer does not know of any English or Irish equity
case in which the question has been raised by either court or counsel.
Sir Thomas Plummer's suggestion that before bill filed the defendant
can recede from the contract would seem not to be again referred to.
It would mean that the filing of the bill made the contract. Beside
the fact that there would not appear to be any reason for this fiction,
it had already been distinctly rejected by Lord Eldon in Gaskarth v.
Lord Lowther, 12 Ves. 107, I8O5. There C. became the purchaser at
The purchase not being completed, B. notified
auction of B.'s estate.
C. that if his conveyance was not accepted within a period stated, B.
would not consider himself bound any further. Long afterwards B.
again wrote to C., reminding him of his purchase and urging him to
complete. C. brought a bill against B. for specific performance. In
his answer C. denied the binding effect of the contract, but offered
to perform. The decree was that C. should pay the purchase price
into court before a day certain and obtain a conveyance, else his bill
to stand dismissed. C. paid the money into court in accordance with
this decree and died, leaving A. his devisee under a will made after
the bill was filed, but before decree, and D. and E. his co-heirs at
law. The question in the case was whether in equity the conversion
had taken place at the date of the wills, wills carrying real property
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It will be noted that, as in the early English cases, the
defence of lack of mutuality, to which the court in Martin v.
Mitchell replies, is not lack of mutuality in the remedy in
equity, but in the obligation. I do not know of any English
case, where the plaintiff has not signed, that raises the.qbjection that there is no mutuality of equitable remedy; I believe this can be accounted for by the fact that the admission that it was finally settled, that the plaintiff who had
not 'signed had a right to a bill in equity immediately
preceded the decision of Flight v. Bolland which, as we have
heretofore noted, was the first case to clearly announce the
25
principle that in equity there must be mutuality of remedy.

As a result we may say that the modern defence of lack of
mutuality in the remedy was born with the admission that it
did not apply to cases under the fourth section of the statute
where the plaintiff who had not signed sought specific performance. Thus the new phase of the defence of lack of
mutuality was accommodated to the century and a half
practice of the Court of Chancery, by the statement that the
defence of lack of mutuality of remedy, only applied to cases
where the remedy was not mutual at the time the decree was
made.
The opinion of Lord Redesdale in Lawrenson v. Butler,
26
had more influence in the United States than in England.
The case is first mentioned with approval by Chancellor Kent
in Parkhurstv. Van Cortlandt.2 7 There the plaintiff asked
possessed at the date of execution only. This question in turn
depended on whether there was a contract between the parties at the
date of the bill. The lirst contract, if any there was, had been abandoned by the first letter or communication mentioned. Lord Eldon
thought that the second letter failed to make a contract. There being
no contract in existence, Lord Eldon points out that the filing of a
bill did not make a contract, and that there was no contract between
the parties until C. accepted the alternative given him by the decree
and paid the money into court. Hovenden in his annotations to
Vesey's Reports points out the conflict of Sir Thomas Plummer's
opinion with that of Lord Eldon.
4 Rus. 298, 1828. See First Paper, May number, supra, page 273.
' See for a discussion of the greater effect of the decision in America
than in England in preventing the specific performance of contracts
containing an option, Third Paper, August number, supra, page 448.
2I Johns. Ch. 273 (N. Y.), 1814, page 282.
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for specific performance of a contract concerning lands which
he had not signed. The defendant set up the statute of
frauds, the fourth section of the English statute being then
in force in New York. But the reason for the defendant's
pleading the statute seems to have been, not the fact that
the plaintiff had not signed, but the fact that the memorandum signed by the defendant was not sufficient under
the statute. However, the citation of Lawrenson v.
Butler seems to have had its effect, as shortly afterwards,
in the case of Benedict v. Lynch,28 the chancellor intimates,

though the opinion was not necessary for the decision, that
Lord Redesdale was correct in his application of the defence
of lack of mutuality as defeating a plaintiff who had not
signed. In support of this position the chancellor not only
cites the case of Huddleston v. Briscoe, before Lord Eldon,
but a case at law arising under the seventeenth section of
the statute,) Champion v. Plummer.29 This citation of a
case at law seems to show that the chancellor was not
dealing with the question whether specific performance could be had of a contract signed only by the defendant,
but with the more fundamental question, whether under the
circumstance of one party only having signed, there is any
contract at all. The arrangement of his opinion in Clason
v. Bailey 30 also lends itself to the idea that the real question
to be decided is whether there is any contract. Clason v.
Bailey was a case at law under the seventeenth section.
Chancellor Kent after an examination of cases at law and in
equity under the fourth and seventeenth sections of the
statute admits "There is nothing to disturb this strong and
united current of authority," admitting the obligation of the
i Johns. Ch. 370 (N. Y.) 1815, pages 373 and 374.

There are two reports of this case, one 5 Bos. & P. (i N. S.) 252,
i8o5, and the other 5 Esp. 240. It is from the last report that Chancellor Kent takes the case, and in this report Sir James Mansfield is
made to seem to take the position that both the buyer and seller of
goods should sign before either could be charged at law. The report
in Bosanquet and Puller makes the court discuss an entirely different
matter.

In Allen v. Bennett, 3 Taun. i6g, i8io, Sir James Mansfield

himself declares that the fact that the plaintiff had not signed was not
discussed in the earlier case.
so 14 Johns, 484 (N. Y.), 1817.
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defendant though the plaintiff has not signed, but the observations of Lord Chancellor Redesdale in Lawrenson v.
Butler.3 1
Subsequent to Clason v. Bailey the cases in equity discussing the defence of lack of mutuality to a bill for the specific
performance of a contract relating to -real property, -Where
only the defendant has signed, fall into two classes. One
class discusses the question of lack of mutuality of obligation
as affecting the existence of the contract, ignoring the fact
that there may be a good contract at law, but one which
equity will not enforce.32 In this class of cases specific performance is given, because the court thinks there is sufficient
mutuality of obligation to make a good contract, the specific
enforcement of the-contract being taken for granted. 33 In
Page 488. It is doubtful however whether Chancellor Kent did
confuse in his own mind the question of the existence of a contract and
its specific performance in equity, for on page 487 he seems to approve
of the cases at law, while on pages 488, 49o, though he admits that it
appears to be settled that the plaintiff can have specific performance,
he expresses the opinion that the weight of the argument is against
the relief.
Z Examples of this class are Getchell v. Jewett, 4 Green, 350 (Me.)
1826, pages 366, 367; M'Crea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. 46o (N. Y.), 1836,
page 465; Old Colony R. R. v. Evans, 6 Gray, 25 (Mass.) 1856, pages
31, 32 and 33; Farwell v. Lowther, 18 Ill. 252, 1857, page 255; Esmay
v. Gorton, I8 Ill. 483, 1857, page 486; Chambers v. Alabama Iron Co.,
67 Ala. 353, i88o; Carskaddonv. Kennedy, 4o N. J.'Eq. 259,1885; Miller
v. Cameron, 15 Atl. 845 (N. J.), 1888. In the following cases the
validity of the contract as such was discussed, the word mutuality not
being used in connection with the circumstance that the plaintiff had
not signed. The question of specific performance of such contracts,
granting they were good at law, seems to have been taken for granted.
Perkins v. Hadsell, 50 Ill. 216, 1869, page 22o; Capeharr v. Hale,
6 W. Va. 547, 1873; Marqueze v. Caldwell, 48 Miss. 23, 1873, overruling in Lee v. Dozier, 4o Miss. 481, 1865.
In regarding the contract as good when proved only by the signature of the party defendant, the cases in the previous note are followed
by cases at law where the suit is on a contract falling under the fourth
section of the English statute, or similar enactments in this country. See
for example Mirzell v. Burnett, 4 Jones 249 (N. C.), 1857; Ballard v.
Walker, 3 Johns, 6o (N. Y.) 1802; Hanson v. Barnes, 3 Gill & Johnson, 359 (Md.), 1831; Kizer v. Locke, 9 Ala. 269, 1846; Mirzell v.
Barnett, 4 Jones 249 (N. C.), 1857; Luckett v. Williamson, 37 Mo.

,88, 1866.
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the second class of cases the question discussed under
the defence of lack of mutuality, is not whether there is a
good contract, but whether, admitting this to be so, there is
not sufficient lack of mutuality in the remedy to prevent a
court of chancery from granting specific performance. The
earliest case of this class is Rogers v. Saunders.34 Here
there is a clear separation of the question whether there is a
good contract, from the question of its specific enforcement,
though the only explanation of why equity grants specific
performance is that the court find a contract legally binding. 35 Other cases of this class grant specific performance
on the ground that the words of the statute indicate that
a defendant who has signed can be charged in equity as well
as at law.

36

In Vassault v. Edwards,3 7 the court holds, that the
act of filing the bill makes the remedy mutual. It will be
noted that these explanations of why specific performance
should be granted, in spite of the objection of lack of mutuality in the remedy, are identical with those given in the early
English cases, when the objection was not to lack of mutuality in the remedy in equity, but to lack of mutuality in the
obligation. They have no relation to the objection of lack
of mutuality in the remedy. To this objection perhaps the
best reply is the one found in the case of Ives v. Hazard-s
that "mutuality of remedy existing at the time action is
brought is all that is required to enable a plaintiff to maintain
his action."3 9 This is not exactly an answer, but it is, as we
have seen, in accord with the fact that the idea of mutuality
Me. 92, 1839.
Page 97. See also Shirley v. Shirley, 7 Black, 452 (Ind.), 1845;

' 16

Moses v. McClain, 2 S. 741 (Ala.), 1887.

' See Martin v. Grimes, 88 Mo. 478, 1885. The case of McPherson
v.Fargo, 74 N. W. 1057 (S.D.), 1898, proceeds on the same reason,
but there is a statute in the jurisdiction expressly giving specific performance where only the defendant has signed. See Sec. 463o Comp.
Laws.
'43 Cal. 458, 1872, page 465, counteracting the opposite inference
to be drawn from the language of the same court in Cooper v. Penna.,
21 Cal. 403, 1863.
4 R. I. 14, 1855.
Page 28. See also Estes v. Furlong, 59 II. 298, 1871, page 302.
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of remedy in equity as we now know it, grew up after the
practice of granting specific performance to a plaintiff who
had not signed was well established.
Whether the court discusses lack of mutuality in the obligation, or lack of mutuality in the remedy irr equity,. theobjection is always decided against the defeindhnt. It is
a general rule where the fourth section of the English
statute of frauds is in force, that the fact that the plaintiff
has not signed the contract does not prevent him from having
specific performance, provided the defendant has signed it.
This general trend of authority is followed in cases where
the defence of lack of mutuality is not raised, or if raised, is
40
not discussed.
Apparently the only state, having the fourth section of the
41
statute, to follow Lord Redesdale's opinion is Maryland.
As seen elsewhere42 the cases of Geiger v. Green43 and
Tyson v. Watts, 44 decided in 1846 and 1847 respectively,
introduced the idea of mutuality for which Lawrenson v.
Butler stands. Therefore in 1850 in Duvall v. Myers,45
the court, quoting at length from Geiger v. Green, and
Lawrenson v. Butler, refuses to give specific performance of
contract for the sale of standing timber, against a vendee
who had signed, at the instance of a vendor who had not,
'*-ones v. Robbins,

29

Me. 351, 1849; *Plunkett v. The Methodist

Soc., 3 Cush. 561 (Mass.), 1849; *Parker v. Perkins, 8 Cush. 318
(Mass.), 1851; *Murphy v. Marland, lb. 573, 1851; Johnson v. Dodge,
17 Ill. 433, 1856; *Barnardv. Lee, 97 Mass. 92, 1867; *Ewiins v. Gordon,
49 N. H. 444, 187o; Howland v. Bradley, 38 N. J. Eq. 288, 1844 (settling
doubt expressed in Laning v. Cole, 4 N. 3. Eq. 229, x842); Wilks v.
Georgia,Pacific R. R., 79 Ala. i8o, 1885; Linn v. McLean, 85 Ala. 250,
1887, dicta; Ross v. Parks,93 Ala. i53, 189o. The cases marked thus (*)
are cases in which the defendant had signed a bond conditioned to convey, and the plaintiff had not signed anything.
" The English Statute of Frauds is in force in Maryland, not because
of any legislative enactment, but merely because it is held to be one
of the English statutes applicable to, and therefore enforced in the
state.
"Third Paper, August number, supra, 452.
" 4 Gill. 472, 1846.
"I Md. Ch. 13, 1847.
"2 Md. Ch. 401.
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because the agreement, being only signed by one, is not
46
"obligatory on both parties."
In 1830 the State of New York, which had had before that
date the English statute of frauds, revised her laws. In place
of the fourth section of the English statute the following
was adopted: "Every contract for the leasing for the
longer period than one year, or for the sale of any lands, or
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract or
some note or memorandum therefore expressing the consideration be in writing and be subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made." 47 This statute, which
makes the signature of the vendor, not the party to .be
charged necessary, is now in force in several of the states
and territories. 4 In Tennessee the words "party to be
charged" have been held to mean the party who owns the
land. 49

In these states, where the owner of the land has

signed the memorandum, the defence of lack of mutuality
cannot be properly raised by either party. If the vendee
is defendant he cannot say that he could not enforce the
obligations of the vendor, and if the vendor is defendant
the fact that the vendee has not signed, does not enable him
'Page 405. The fact that the court seems to have been unaware
that Lord Redesdale's opinion was not generally followed, and the
fact that the memorandum signed by the defendant was hardly sufficient under the statute, takes some value from the case. But the
writer cannot find that it has been reversed. Indeed the subsequent
application of the theory of lack of mutuality to defeat a plaintiff
who held an option would appear to render such reversal improbable.
See Rider v. Gray, io Md. 282, 1856, Third Paper, August number,
supra, page 453.

' Stat. at Large, Part II, Chap. vii, title I, sec. 8. There was a
slight change in the phraseology of the enactment in 1896. See N. Y.
Rev. Stat., Vol. 5, page 3588, § 224, but the requirement respecting the
signature of the owner was retained.
'Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah and Wisconsin. It was in force in
California from i85o to 1873. The fourth section of the English
statute is in force, thdugh slightly different phraseology is used, in all
other states and territories except New Mexico, Pennsylvania and
Washington.
IFrazerv. Ford, 2 Head. 464, 1859.
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to assert that if he was plaintiff he would be powerless to
enforce the plaintiff's obligation. 50
Where, however, the vendor who has not signed is plaintiff, two objections can be raised to granting his bill. One
is the objection that the statute requires the signature of the
vendor, making no distinction between the case where the
vendor is plaintiff and where he is defendant. This would
appear to be the attitude of the New York Courts. The
cases in the notes seem to assume, that if the vendee has not
signed there is no contract for equity to enforce.5 The
other objection that could be raised to the plaintiff's bill is
thaf" though the statute means to require the vendor's signature only in case he is a party defendant, the fact that the
vendor has not signed would prevent the enforcement of the
contract against him, and therefore there is lack of mutuality. As far as the writer knows the defence as indicated
has not been raised in any jurisdiction having the New York
statute.
In Pennsylvania, however, in an analogous but not identical case, the defence of lack of mutuality has been successfully raised. The first three sections of the English statute
of the frauds are in force in that State. The fourth section is
not in force. As a consequence of this peculiarity the courts
of the state have taken the position that one who entered into
a parole contract for the sale or purchase of an interest 5in2
land can at law sue for damages for a breach of the same.
The remaining question is whether specific performance can
be had of such a contract. The first case which carefully
considers this subject is that of Wilson v. Clarke.53 There
' Senzble Bigler v. Baker, 38 N. W. lO26 (Neb.), 1894. The impossibility of raising the defehce of lack of mutuality in case the vendor has
signed and the difference between the statutes requiring the signature of the vendor and the fourth section of the English Statute of
Frauds seems to have been overlooked by the Supreme Court of
Nebraska in Gartrellv. Stafford jI2 Neb. 545, 1882.
Champlin v. Parrish, ii Paige, 4o8 (N. Y. Ch.), 1834. The point
is assumed in McWhorter v. McMahan, io Paige, 393 (N. Y. Ch.),
1842.
See Pennsylvania cases cited in this Paper.
CSI W. & S. 554 (Pa.), 1841. See also Irvine v. Bull, 4 Watts, 287
(Pa.), x835, and Ellet v. Paxson, 2 W. & S. 418, 1841.
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A. and B. entered into a parole agreement whereby A. agreed
to sell and B. to buy certain land. A. offered B. a deed
which B. refused. As the action of assumpsit is used in the
state as a substitute for a bill in equity, where the plaintiff
would in equity demand the payment of a sum of money, A.
sued B. in assumpsit for the full contract price of the land. 4
The court treat the case as if the vendor had brought a
bill in equity for specific performance. It will be noted that
the court had before them the same question which arises in
England and other jurisdictions, having the fourth section
of the statute of fraud, where the plaintiff who has not signed
seeks to enforce the contract against the defendant who-has.
Cases at law of the type of Clason v. Bailey decide that there
is a good contract at law if only the defendant has signed.
The absence of the fourth section in Pennsylvania makes
the contract good at law though neither party has signed.
When, therefore, in Wilson v. Clarke, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania had before them a case where the vendor
in effect asked specific performance, they had before them
a case in which the vendor could recover at law, but because
of the first section of the English statute of frauds, the vendee
could not have had specific performance in equity. This is
the conception which Judge Gibson had of the ease before
him. He regarded it as one involving the question of mutuality as a defence in equity anct he relies in his decision on
Lord Redesdale's criticism of the practice in England of
granting specific performance when only the defendant has
signed. He pointi out that while the contract would be, as
stated, recognized at law, the existence of the first section of
the English statute would prevent the defendant from securing the land. Thii fact he regards as fatal to the present action, because*". . . it is a cardinal principle that a chancellor,

when uncontrolled by arbitrary enactment, executes no
contract which is not the source of mutual obligation and
mutual remedy." He acknowledges the fact that the early
English practice was to give spetific performance to a plain5

He also moved on the trial of the ause for leave to file a new
count charging the defendant with damages for breach of contract.
This the trial court refused. For this cause thejudgment was reversed.
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tiff who had not signed, and that the opinion of Lord Redesdale had not been adopted in England or in New York, but
this admission only adds force to the decision, as one of the
few which on careful consideration have adopted Lord
Redesdale's views.5

A curious misapplication of the ideas of judge Gibson
and Lord Redesdale was made by one of the courts of Common Pleas of the state in the case of Parrish v. Koons.5 6
A bill for specific performance was filed by the vendor of real
estate. The court decided that the vendee had not signed. 5"
It was also held that the buyer had to sign in order to place
him in a position of being forced to accept an estate in the
land, because the first section of the statute speaks of "parties
or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized in writing."
This position that an estate cannot be vested in a man who
has not signed the contract because of the wording of the
first section of the statute ended the case before the court.
It was at the time contrary to the position already assumed by
the Supreme Court of the state in Lowry v. Mehaffy.5 s
Not content, however, with this disposition of the case,
the court goes on to point out, as an additional reason for
refusing the plaintiff's bill, that "mutuality of obligations
'The force of the repudiation of the idea that a plaintiff who has
not signed cannot have specific performance is hardly weakened by
the fact that Judge Gibson yielded to the peculiar temptation of all
judges to distinguish between the case before him and the cases
which he was in effect refusing to follow. He points out that the
English and New York cases all discuss the effect of the fourth section of the English statute, requiring that contracts concerning land
or some note thereof, shall be in writing "signed by the party to be
charged," and that it is upon the use of the words "party to be
charged," that the cases giving specific performance to the plaintiff
who has not signed have been decided. Of course, the reductio ad
absurdum of this reasoning is that it uses the fact that the English
statute requires contracts concerning land to be proved by writing,
when the Pennsylvania statute does not as a reason for refusing in
the latter case the specific perfornance which is granted in the former.
l Pars. Eq. Cas. 78 (Pa.) 1844.
"A memorandum had been signed by the agent of the vendee, but
the agent had not been constituted as such by the vendee in writing.
"io Watts. 387 (Pa.) 184o. There is, however, ground for the
position taken in Parrishv. Koons that this case was a case of sufficient
part performance to take it outside of the statute.
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in contracts sought to be specifically performed, is an essential requisite to authorize equitable intervention between the
parties. 59 This application of the idea of mutuality is unique.
Since the plaintiff had signed, there was no question but that
specific performance could be had against him. It may be
that the statute required the vendee's signature, but certainly
there was no question of lack of mutuality. The plaintiff
by signing had fulfilled the requirement of the statute. Yet
the idea of the court seems to be that since, had the plaintiff
not signed, no relief could be given against him, having
signed, he should have no relief against a purchaser who had
not signed. 60
Of course, in a case in Pennsylvania like Parrishv. Koons,
where the plaintiff vendor only has signed, no question of
lack of mutuality can properly arise. If the position taken in
that case is adopted, namely that the first section of the
statute requires the defendant vendee to sign in order to
create an interest in land, the vendor who has signed should
fail to force the land on the vendee because a positive requirement of the statute is lacking, not because of lack of mutuality. On the other hand, if the position generally assumed
is correct, that the first section of the statute only requires the
signature of the grantor or vendor in cases where he is party
defendant, then the vendor, having signed, can have specific
performance, and specific performance can also be had
against him, and no question of mutuality of remedy or obligation is raised. As a matter of fact the position of Parrish
v. Koons has never been adopted by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. On the contrary there are several decisions
subsequent to that case in effect granting specific performance to the vendor or vendee in a contract concerning land,
where only the vendor has sigkied. 61 On the other hand the
Page 89, citing Lawrenson v. Butler.

Page 897. The position taken in Parrish v. Koons that the vendee
must sign in order to give him an interest in the land which a court of
equity can enforce in his favor or against him was apparently approved by dicta in another county court decision, Patton v. Develin,
2 Phila. xo3 (Pa.) 1856.
' M'Farson's App., ii Pa. 5o3, 1849, vendee plaintiff, Shoofstall v.

Adams, 2 Grant, 209, 1858, vendee plaintiff; Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 424,
1867, vendor plaintiff; Johnston v. Cowan, 59 Pa. 275, 1868, vendor
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position of Judge Gibson in Wilson v. Clarke has been consistently followed and specific performance denied to the
vendor of a parole contract concerning land.

2

In Pennsyl-

vania, therefore, the influence of Lord Redesdale's opinion,
and the eighteenth century ideas of lack of mutuality there
involved is still felt. Were the fourth section of the statute
to be adopted in the state, the court would have to reverse the
principle on which they.Jnow deny specific performance
to the vendor in a parole contract relating to land; if they
desired to follow other jurisdictions in permitting specific
performance to a plaintiff who has not signed. In this connection it is well to remember, that though the cases of
Wilson v. Clarke and Bodine v. Glading introduced the
eighteenth century ideas of lack of mutuality as a defence
in equity, the courts of the state, while, as we have just seen
applying those ideas to cases under the statute, refuse to
apply them to the case where the plaintiff seeks to enforce
an option.6 3

At the same time it may be remarked that

there has been no confusion and contradiction in the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the state. The assumption that
such was the case by the late Judge Reed, 64 being due to his
failure to distinguish between parole agreements and those
in which the vendor has signed.
Turning to the specific performance of contracts affected
by the seventeenth section of the English statute of frauds,
plaintiff; Smith's App., 69 Pa. 474, 1871, vendee plaintiff; Cadwalader's
App., 8i Pa. 194, 1876, dicta, as the contract was signed by both; Swisshelm v. The Swissvale Laundry Co., 95 Pa. 367, i88o, vendor plaintiff
(the part of the case under the contract signed by vendor).
Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. 335, I869. Sands v. Arthur, 84 Pa. 479
1877; Sausser v. Steinmetz, 88 Pa. 324; 18??; Swisshelm v. The Swissvale Laundry Co., 95 Pa. 367, 1M8o. (The part of the case on the
verbal contract.) It is curious to note that in Meason v. Kaine, a case
which is identical with Wilson v. Clarke, the former case is not mentioned, but the ideas of Lord Redesdale, which defeat the plaintiff,
are introduced through the medium of the case of Bodine v. Glading, 21
Pa. 50, 1853. A case which has nothing to do with the statute of
frauds, but is identical with Lawrenson v. Butler, and which we have
discussed in the Third Paper, August number, supra, page 453, et seq.
"Corson v. Mulvaney, 49 Pa. 88, 1865, and case discussed, Third
Paper, August number, supra, page 455.
"Reed, Statute of Frauds, sec. 367.
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we find that there is a difference between the language of the
two sections. While the fourth section declares that the
memorandum must be signed by the "party to be charged,"
the seventeenth section uses the words "parties to be
charged." Whether the seventeenth section requires the
signature of both parties, or whether the word is used in
the sense that there may be more than one party defendant,
which is much more likely to be the case in a contract concerning goods than in a contract concerning land, is not an
equitable but rather a legal question. The statute applies
to suits at law, as well as equity. If at law it had been
held that both plaintiff and defendant must sign, equity
would have no reason for granting specific performance
where only the defendant had signed. But it has been generally held at law, on both sides of the Atlantic that the word
"parties" in the seventeenth section means party or-parties
defendant, and that there is no difference in this respect between the two sections of the statute. 65
Apparently the first reported case involving the question is Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. and Pa. 238, i8oo. Another early case is
Egerton v. Matthews, 6 East. 307, 1805. In neither case was the fact
that the plaintiff had not signed adverted to by court or counsel. This
statement appears to be also true of a third early case, Champion v.
Plummer, 5 Bos. and Put. 252 (1 N. S. 1805, in spite of a contrary
report in 5 Espanasse, 240; see supra, note 29. In the case of Alber v.
Bennet, 3 Taun, i69, 181o, the question was raised and decided against
the defendant. See also Liverpool Borough Bank v. Eccles, 4 H. & N.
137, 1859. Some of the American cases are: Douglass v. Spears, 2 Nott
& McCord, 207 (S. C.) i8ig; Barstow v. Gray, 3 Greenleaf, 409 (Me.)
1825, dicta; Russell v. Nicoll, 3 Wend. 117 (N. Y.) 1829; Davis v.
Shields, 26 Wend. 341 (N. Y.) 1841; Smith v. Smith, 8 Blackford, 209
(Ind.) 1847; Cummings v. Dennett, 26 Me. 397, 1847, dicta; Linton v.
Williams, 25 Ga. 391, 1858; Morin v. Martz, 13 Minn, I11, 1868;
Wemple v. Knopf, 15 Minn. 44o, 187o, dicta; Brooklyn Oil Refinery v.
Brown, 38 How. Prac. 444, 1870. In these states when the above cases
were decided, either the seventeenth section of the English statute was
in force, or the words "parties to be charged" were used in an analogous
section. At the present time the great majority of the states not adopting the New York statute, while they require contracts for the sale
of goods to be manifested in writing, use the words of the fourth section
of the English statute in requiring the signature of the party to be
charged. This is now true of Arkansas, California Indiana, Georgia,
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
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As a result of this attitude of the courts of law, there
would appear to be no question, except in Maryland, that
in spite of the seventeenth section, whether the statute in the
jurisdiction uses the word party or the word parties, the
defendant having signed a-contract for the sale of goods, the
contract being one that a court of equity would otherwise
enforce, the plaintiff who has not signed can have specific
performance. Owing to the fact that contracts for the sale
of goods are rarely subject to specific performance in any
event, cases where a plaintiff who has not signed has
sought specific performance are almost unknown. The
question is elaborately discussed in Woodward v. Aspinwall,66 the opinion of the court being favorable to the plaintiff, though his bill was dismissed on another ground. It
again arose in White v. Schuyler,67 when the opinion in the
former case was followed. Of course in the states where
the seventeenth section of the English statute is not in force,
if a plaintiff asks for the specific performance of the sale of
goods, no question under the Statute of Frauds can arise. 6a
William Draper Lewis.

Oregon, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming. As there are several
states (see infra) where the seventeenth section is not in force, the
question can now only arise in states adopting the New York statutes,
which use the word parties, and in Missouri, South Carolina and
Maryland, where the English statute in its entirety is in force.
Michigan, which adopts the New York statute, uses the word party in
dealing with contracts for the sale of goods.
Ca3 Sand. S. C. R. (N. Y.) 272, 1849.
O I Abb. Pr. N. S. 300, 1 (N. Y.)
1865.
' The seventeenth section is not in force in Alabama, Delaware,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia.

